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THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
PROPONENTS of resale price maintenance 1 are presently seeking to revitalize
"fair trade" through federal legislation, 2 and thus to overcome a recent series of
judicial setbacks. Federal courts have held the application of state fair trade
statutes to interstate mail order sales consummated in non-fair-trade areas
beyond the scope of the McGuire Act,3 which immunizes state price mainte-
nance legislation from the federal antitrust laws. 4 And seventeen state courts
1. State resale price maintenance acts allow producers or distributors of goods which
carry their trademark or trade name to contract with retailers to resell his goods at not
less than a minimum resale price, and-through "nonsigner clauses"- to bind all re-
tailers to sell at not less than the stipulated price. In a minority of states, the producer
may set the exact price. Note, 69 HARV. L. REv. 316 (1955) (giving detailed history).
2. See Hearings on. H.R. 768, 1253, 2463, 2729, 3187, 5252 and 5602 Before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign, Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1959) [here-
inafter cited as 1959 Hearings] ; Hearings on H.R. 10527, 10770, 10847, 11048, 11216, and
11264 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign, Corn-
mnerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 676 (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 Hearings] ; N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1958, p. 20, col. 5.
3. The leading case is General Elec. Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 244 F.2d 681
(2d Cir. 1957), which held that the defendant, in the District of Columbia, could sell fair-
traded goods at cut prices by mail to buyers in fair-trade states. This case was a logical
extension of Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co., 240 F.2d 684 (4th
Cir. 1957), which held that advertisement in Maryland of lower than fair-trade prices by
a District of Columbia retailer was not in violation of the Maryland Fair Trade Act.
Another decision has proscribed a fair-trade agreement between a wholesaler and a
manufacturer, competing in selling to retailers, as a horizontal agreement not exempted
by the McGuire Act. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
This case has been criticized, however, as overreaching congressional intent by limiting
the McGuire Act's application. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1246, 1254-55 & n.31 (1958). In Esso
Standard Oil Co. v. Secatore's, Inc., 246 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1957) (gasoline refiner who
sold to commercial fleets of vehicles in competition with a gasoline retailer), McKesson
was followed and expanded in dictum. "[A]ny competition for customers is an absolute
bar to price maintenance agreements between the competitors." Id. at 22. It would seem,
however, that the McKesson rule as interpreted in Secatore's is limited in application.
See General Elec. Co. v. Hess Bros., 155 F. Supp. 57, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (plaintiff-
manufacturer's discount sales to its employees for their own use does not make them com-
petitors of defendant retailer within prohibition of the Sherman Act); Revlon, Inc. v.
Wagonfeld, TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 21, 1959)
(plaintiff's own beauty salon, operated for demonstration purposes, did not bar right of
plaintiff to fair trade because some retail sales were also made). H.R. 1253, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2, p. 6, lines 14-18 (1959), would allow producers or distributors in the Mc-
Kesson situation to fair trade their products if "such sales to retailers are made at the
same prices he establishes for such wholesale distributors for comparable sales, and...
he is not a wholesale distributor of products other than products which he manufac-
tures."
4. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958). The McGuire Act specifically vali-
dated nonsigner clauses. Earlier, the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C.
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have effectively eliminated fair trade by ruling that the crucial "nonsigner"
provisions-which bind all retailers to observe the fixed price whether or not
they have so agreed-are violations of state constitutional guarantees,5 or have
held resale price maintenance impliedly repealed -by state antitrust laws.0 As a
§ 1 (1958) had exempted fair trade from the federal antitrust laws, but Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341, U.S. 384 (1951), held Miller-Tydings inapplicable
to nonsigner provisions.
Fair-trade pricing is contradictory to the general objective of the antitrust laws--
"promotion of competition in open markets." Arry GEN. NATfL Comu. AinTRusT REP.
1, 154 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN. REP.]; FTC, RERo-r o. RESALE PracE
MAi TENANcE at LX-LXI (1945) [hereinafter cited as FTC REmRT]. If the fair-trade
acts merely prevented ruinous competition among retailers, and thereby, in the long run,
preserved competition, this might well be in keeping with antitrust policy. The fair-trade
laws go further, however, and prevent price competition among retailers selling fair-
traded articles, establishing, in effect, horizontal agreements among retailers to sell at fixed
prices. Ibid.
5. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., Inc., 224 Ark. 558, 275
S.W2d 455 (1955) (deprivation of due process) : Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Fran-
cis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P2d 139 (1956) (deprivation of due process and improper dele-
gation of police power) ; Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Ben Greene, Inc., 54 So. 2d 235
(Fla. 1951) ; Cox v. General Elec. Co., 21,1 Ga. 286, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955) (due process) ;
Bargain Barn, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70463 (Ind. Super. CL) (in
derogation of Indiana constitution) ; Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958) (improper delegation of legislative power); General
Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958) (due process); Dr.
G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarkets, 231 La. 51,
90 So. 2d 343 (1956) (improper delegation) ; Shakespeare Co. v. Lippman's Tool Shop
Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 263 (1952) (due process); McGraw
Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 68 .N.W.2d 608 (1955) (due proc-
ess) ; Skaggs Drug Center v. General Elec. Co., 63 N.M. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957) (im-
proper exercise of police power) ; Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Bargain Fair, Inc.,
167 Ohio St. 182, 147 N.E2d 481 (1958) (improper exercise of police power); General
Elec. Co. v. "Vahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956) (improper delegation of legis-
lative power; due process) ; Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1955 Trade
Cas. 70481 (S.C. Richland County Ct) (alternative holding) (due process); General
Elec. Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741 (1956) (conflict with anti-
trust section of Utah constitution) ; General Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., 103
S.E.2d 310 (-V. Va. 1958) (improper exercise of police power).
In Arizona, however, a decision of a lower court holding a nonsigner clause uncon-
stitutional has been reversed. General Elec. Co. v. Telco Supply Co., 84 Ariz. 132, 325
P.2d 394 (1958), reversing 1956 Trade Cas. 72212 (Ariz. Super. Ct.).
6. Benrus Watch Co. v. Kirsch, 198 Va. 94, 92 S.E.2d 384 (1956).
A federal district court has held that the Hawaii Fair Trade Act is in conflict with
§ 3 of the Sherman Act, which proscribes restraint of territorial trade, and that the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts are operative only with respect to Sherman Act § 1.
Sunbeam Corp. v. Gem Jewelry Co., 157 F. Supp. 838 (D. Hawaii 1957). But the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii has held that the territorial fair trade act was exempted. John-
son & Johnson, Inc. v. G.E.M. Sundries Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) f 69253
(Hawaii Sup. Ct. Jan. 16, 1959), reversing 1958 Trade Cas. 73751 (Hawaii Cir. Ct.).
The question of whether the McGuire Act exempts the Hawaiian Fair Trade Act from
the Sherman Act is a federal question because it involves interpretation uf a federal
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result, fair trade protection is available in only twenty-nine states, 7 and in-
applicable, even there, to mail orders from other jurisdictions. Contemporane-
ously, abandonment by several leading brand-name producers in what were
formerly "fair trade industries" has further restricted fair trade coverage.0
Moreover, mail order merchandising 10 has grown in importance, and large
chains and discount houses-retailers who have generally chosen to ignore
fair trade and seek profits through a larger volume of cut-price sales-have
been propelled into increasing preeminence."
The proposed federal legislation-H.R. 1253 12 -- attempts to strengthen fair
trade by extending coverage to all states and, concomitantly, to all mail order
houses. 13 The bill would create a right of action in federal court, irrespective
of diversity of citizenship, to enforce adherence to the manufacturer's stipu-
statute. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). Therefore the decision of the
Hawaii Supreme Court is not binding upon the federal courts. Maternally Yours, Inc.
v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.1 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Sunbeam Corp.
v. Gem Jewelry Co., supra at 840. Nonetheless, it would seem correct to say that the
Hawaiian Act retains its force, since the grounds for the federal decision-Hawaii's terri-
torial status-became invalid with Hawaii's entrance into the Union. See Act of March 18,
1959, No. 86-3, 73 Stat 4.
7. That is, all states other than the seventeen which have eliminated fair trade, see
notes 5-6 supra, and Missouri, Vermont, Texas and Alaska, which have never enacted
resale price maintenance.
8. "Fair-trade industries" refers to those in which an appreciable percentage of the
goods are fair traded, e.g., drugs, electrical appliances, cameras, cosmetics, books, sporting
equipment, and alcoholic beverages. Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cui. L. REV.
175, 179 (1954). While less than 10% of all retail goods are fair traded, 1958 Hearings
43, 105, and the percentage of fair trading manufacturers is small even in the above men-
tioned industries, 1958 Hearings 345, the manufacturers who do fair trade are usually
among the largest in their industry. 1958 Hearings 609.
9. The General Electric Co., the Sunbeam Corp. and the Toastmaster division of
McGraw-Edison, Inc., leading enforcers of fair trade, have all abandoned price mainte-
nance. They were followed by the Ronson Corp., the Royal MeBee Corp., and other
appliance manufacturers. The Westinghouse Corp. had dropped fair trade two years
earlier. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1958, § 3, p. 1, col. 1 ; 1958 Hearings 203. The feeling was
expressed that the hostile attitude of the courts made any attempts at fair trade enforce-
ment futile. Statement of the General Electric Co., id. at 319; Statement of Sunbeam Corp.,
id. at 279-80.
10. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1959, § 3, p. 1, col. 7 (catalog sales of Montgomery
Ward, Sears Roebuck and Spiegel, Inc.-three of the nation's largest mail order houses
-reached $1,481,000,000 in 1958) ; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1959, p. 41, col, 2 (sales of these
three mail order firms 132% ahead'of 1958 in the first five months).
11. See 1957 DE,'T oF CommERcE ANN. RETAIL TRADE REP. 5; Revolution it Retail
Selling, U.S. News & World Report, June 20, 1958, p. 48; Fortune, April 1958, pp. 106,
108.
12. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce approved the bill by a vote of 20-9 on May 14, 1959. Wall Street Journal,
May 15, 1959, p. 1, col. 4.
13. H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, pp. 5-7 (1959).
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lated or minimum retail price.14 If the manufacturer's output is "in commerce"
and in "free and open competition with merchandise of the same general class
produced by others,"' 5 all retailers with "actual notice" of the fair trade price
would be bound to observe that price.1 6 The requirement of actual notice,
which supplants "nonsigner" clauses,17 could be met simply by marking the
price on the goods or their container.' s But, the proposed federal legislation
does not create new remedies or reverse the case law which has restricted the
enforcement of existing state statutes. The potential impact of the federal bill
must therefore be assessed by examination of the success of attempts to en-
force the state fair trade laws. If possible plaintiffs-retailers, retail associa-
tions, manufacturers--can not, or will not, enforce fair trade, the federal bill
will prove no more effective than present state statutes.
FAIR TRADE PLAINTIFFS
Tw Retailer
Retailing was once a generally small-scale enterprise, often characterized
by sheltered market areas, tantamount to territorial oligopolies or monopolies,
in which the storekeeper was substantially insulated from price competition.'0
But modern transportation and communication made it possible for a single
outlet to cater to customers over a broad geographic area. Increased volume
selling, resulting in economies of larger scale operation and lower per-unit
overhead costs, were thus realized by some retailers-notably the discount
houses, mail order firms, and large chains.2 0 In addition, many larger retailers
minimized investment in plant and equipment and lowered variable costs by
cutting personnel as well as credit and delivery services. 2 ' The advantages of
larger scale selling and low overhead operation are particularly marked in the
case of relatively high-cost consumer durables; buyers may be willing to
search further and undergo greater inconvenience to obtain bargains in such
items.
Free competition in the consumer market tends to benefit these larger scale
14. H.R. 1253, supra note 13, § 2, at 7, lines 6-24. The bill would allow a manufac-
turer to fix either an exact price or a minimum price. H.R. 1253, supra, § 2, at 6, lines
1-2.
15. H.R. 1253, supra note 13, § 2 at 6, lines 4-5.
16. H.R. 1253, supra note 13, § 2 at 6, lines 1-18.
17. The proposed bill forbids all retailers with notice of a "stipulated" (exact) price
to sell at a different price, or with notice of a minimum price to sell at a lower price.
H.R. 1253, supra note 13, § 2 at 6, lines 19-24, through p. 7, lines 1-5.
Ma See H.R. 1253, supra note 13, § 2 at 5, lines 16-lM
19. YAIIEY, THE EcoNoMIcs OF RESALE PaIC MAINTENAxCe 73-91 (1954) [here-
inafter cited as YAmsy]; GRErHER, PRICE CONTROL U.NDER FAnl TRADE Lzois.Ti.AON 227-
29 (1939) [hereinafter cited as GsrHEaR].
20. See STOCKING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY A.D FRE EhIrrmmsE 315-16 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as STOCKING & WATKINS]; YAmEs" 89; GaR-ruM 229-30.
21. See STOCKING & WATKINS 327-29; YAmEY 6-8, 73-74; GaRruiEn 241-51.
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retailers, and they have by and large opposed fair trade 22 and sought to
maximize profits through increased volume sales. But many smaller dealers,
threatened by displacement, look to fair trade for protection from price com-
petition.2 3 They were the principal backers of the state fair trade acts, 24 as
well as the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts.25 An effectively enforced sys-
tem of resale price maintenance may shelter smaller dealers from technological
shortcomings.
Nevertheless, the fair trade retailers, notwithstanding their enthusiasm,
usually have been unwilling or unable to enforce state acts. 20 This can partly
be attributed to the inadequacy of available remedies-a factor which also con-
tributes to lack of enforcement by manufacturers.2 7 But other obstacles to
enforcement, which especially handicap the marginally profitable retailer (who
normally is the party most interested in price maintenance), may be of equal
importance. The highest legal roadblock to the small retailer's success is a re-
stricted judicial construction of the criteria for standing to sue. The state acts
normally provide that "any person damaged" by the illegal price cutting may
bring suit,28 and the courts have properly interpreted this provision to bar
actions by retailers not in competition with the price cutter. But the judiciary
has taken a limited view of the scope of the geographic area and the range of
products within which retailers are held to be "in competition." As regards
geographic area, it has been held, for example, that package stores less than
four miles apart were not in close enough proximity.2 9 With respect to prod-
ucts, retailers have been held to be competing only when both are selling the
same brand. 0
22. See sources cited note 21 .supra.
23. See STOCKING & WATKINS 315-16; YAMEY 89; GRETHER 229-30.
24. 1958 Hearings 202, 204, 631; MUND, GOVERNMENT AND BusiNEss 434, 436-37, 440
(1950) [hereinafter cited as MUND]; FTC REPORT xxvii, xxxii, Liv, 10, 52-58, 142-56.
25. See sources cited note 24 supra; note 4 supra and accompanying text.
Prior to Miller-Tydings, Congress had refused to enact several fair trade bills. See
FTC RPORT 39-42.
26. Fewer than 10% of the cases summarized in 1 TRADE REG. REP. 11 3015-460 (Cum.
1959) involve retailers as plaintiffs.
27. See notes 106-43 infra and accompanying text.
28. Fair trade acts generally make violations actionable only by "persons damaged."
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are the exceptions. See 1 TRADE REG. RLP. ff 3330
(Cum. 1959). The New Jersey act provides for suit by the producer or distributor of the
commodity or by any retailer selling such commodity at not less than the fair trade pricc.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-3 (Supp. 1958). The Pennsylvania act allows suit by the ven-
dor, buyer, or purchaser of the commodity. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 8 (1953). And
the Ohio act provides for suit by any other retailer of the commodity or at the suit of
any other persons damaged thereby, including the producer of the commodity. Onio REv.
CODE ANN. § 1333.08 (Page 1953).
29. Weisstein v. Peters Corbyan Liquor Store, 104 N.Y.L.J. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; see
Weil, Inc. v. dimbel Bros., 101. N.Y.L.J. 1621 (Sup. Ct. 1939). But cf. Friedman v.
Peller, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 64300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (plaintiff declared to be in
price cutter's "general vicinity").
30. LePage v. Automobile Club, Inc., 17 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Eton Chem-
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The enforcement of maintained prices by retailers is also deterred by the
expenses incident to suits against price cutters. In addition to legal fees, the
acquisition of sufficient evidence to convince a court of alleged violations is
a significant expense.3 1 Cautious selling by a price cutter who fears litigation
may require that the enforcer employ professional shoppers to uncover neces-
sary facts.3 2 And these costs can seldom be recouped through successful suit,
since an injunction and not damages is the usual remedyPas Even if the en-
forcer gains an injunction, additional costs may be necessary to police the
decree and bring possible contempt actions. The enforcer is further handi-
capped; many fair-trade violators are relatively prosperous retailers, often
better able to afford qualified counsel and prolonged litigation.34 Rather than
undertake costly litigation, many retailers may simply discontinue the product.
ists, Inc. v. Sussman, 278 App. Div. 899, 104 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1951). Thus, actions by
retailers selling different brands have been denied. But state statutes and the McGuire
Act, in granting the manufacturer the privilege to fair trade, require that his product be
"in free and open competition with other products of the same general class." This view
that competition for the purposes of fair trade would encompass all brands of products
of the same "general class" conforms to economic reality and to the interpretation of
product markets in other branches of trade regulation law. See Comment, 68 YmAE LJ.
1627, 1632 n.24 (1959). So long as products A and B "have reasonable interchange-
ability," see United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956),
if the price of A is cut in violation of the fair-trade statutes, sellers of B will lose buyers
and will be injured by the price cutting. Therefore, not only the sellers of A, but also
the sellers of B could, if the standing-to-sue requirement were realistically construed, be
given a right of action against the price cutter.
31. The price cutter may keep no record of his sales, may not give sales receipts, and
may be careful to whom he sells at the cut price. See 1958 Hearings 250; Brief for
Appellee, pp. 6, A1-4, A34-35, Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d
467 (2d Cir. 1958). In Revlon, Inc. v. Wagonfeld, TRADE REa. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.)
1169353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 21, 1959), costs of investigating infractions by each of eight
retailers averaged $650 per defendant.
32. See 1958 Hearings 609, 663; Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Feldman, 101 N.Y.LJ.
2930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (court stated that using hired shoppers was practically the
only method of obtaining evidence). Other cases in which evidence was obtained by
shoppers are Sunbeam Corp. v. J. Eis & Sons Appliances, 1956 Trade Cas. 71693 (S.D.
N.Y.); McGraw Elec. Co. v. Rosenberg, 1955 Trade Cas. 70630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
33. See notes 106-43 infra and accompanying text.
34. Price cutters have been able to relitigate any minor issue possibly constituting a
defense. 1958 Hearings 280; cf. Fogel v. Bolet, 87 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Among
the defenses that have been frequently raised are: The product is not in free and open
competition with other products of the same general class, see, e.g., Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc. v. Economy Sales Co., 127 F. Supp. 739 (D. Conn. 1954); defendant merely
leased space to independent concessionaire, see, e.g., Bulova Vatch Co. v. Sattler's, Inc.,
208 Misc. 257, 143 N.Y.S2d 742 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; discriminatory enforcement, see notes
113-16 infra and accompanying text; plaintiff is also a price cutter, see notes 111-12 infra
and accompanying text; lack of standing to sue, see notes 28-30 stpra and accompanying
text; fair trade contract is illegal as a horizontal agreement, see note 3 mspra; Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Rosenblum, 1957 Trade Cas. 72835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); and meeting of competi-
tion, see, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Liberty Drug Co., TRADE REG. Rm. (1959 Trade Cas.) ti
69362 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1959). These are in addition to the statutory defenses of dos-
19591
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Additionally, it is not certain that a system of flawlessly enforced resale
price maintenance would protect smaller retailers or return customers to them.
True, under fair trade the consumer could no longer save money by purchas-
ing fair trade goods at the more distant or less accessible discount house or
mail order concern, and would be inconvenienced by the additional effort. But
fair trade, even at its optimum, only provides a means whereby the manu-
facturers can protect small retailers from price competition in fair traded
products. Although no longer able to undersell his rivals in fair-traded prod-
ucts, the large-scale, low-overhead merchant can attract customers by setting
a lower price for unbranded or non-fair-traded products, which differ only
slightly if at all from fair-traded brands and are often produced by the same
manufacturer.3 5 So long as production is reasonably competitive, price cutting
retailers will have a continuing supply of non-fair-traded substitutes with
which to compete with their higher priced competitors. Consumers might be
increasingly willing to forego an advertised name in order to purchase the
same or similar products at lower prices, especially in the case of high priced
durables. And if the large-scale dealer can maintain a higher profit margin
on non-fair-traded products than his smaller competitors, and/or lower costs
on fair-traded goods through volume, he might be able to engage in more at-
tractive promotion and services. While such dealers currently view price com-
petition as their easiest route to profit maximization, they might be able suc-
cessfully to wage service competition against competitors who have lower
profit margins. Hence, fair trade may be little more than a temporary pallia-
tive for the ills of the smaller retailer and may not prevent the spread of
technological obsolescence.
The Retailers' Association
Associations of retailers might offer a means of overcoming many of the
barriers to individual enforcement of maintained prices.3m Use of specialized
investigative and legal staffs would aid in the uncovering and obtaining of
evidence concerning violations.3 7 Most important, expenditures could be dis-
tributed either among the membership at large or among those members who
ing out sales, sales of damaged or deteriorated goods, sales under court order and sales
to eleemosynary and governmental institutions. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-
a(2). These statutory defenses would also be available under the proposed federal bill.
See H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, p. 8, lines 1-24, through p. 9, lines 1-10 (1959).
35. See note 57 in!ra.
36. There are about 3000 local and 100 national retail trade associations in the United
States. All of the major fields of retailing are represented. Letter From Office of Tech-
nical Services, Trade Association Division, United States Department of Commerce, to
the Yale Law Journal, March 30, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library.
37. Many of the associations have fair-trade committees among whose functions is
the searching out of violations, FTC REPORT 222-23, 240, 243-49, 375; GIrnET 344-48;
Letter From Sumner Silver, Counsel, Central Massachusetts Retail Ass'n, Inc., to the
Yale Law Journal, March 25, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library, as well as a legal staff
which necessarily has daily legal contact with these problems, FTC RFi'oRr 375, 401.
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are usually injured, and could be spread over several years. Periodic "en-
forcement dues" would be an inexpensive form of insurance premium for each
member against the possibility of suddenly being forced to bear the expense
of a suit. Joint action would also eliminate possible expenses of duplication
stemming from a multiplicity of suits against a single violator.
One factor which may inhibit enforcement by associations of retailers is
their potential failure to obtain standing to sue as a "person damaged."'as
Although in the only case directly on point, a New York trial court ruled that
an association whose members would have been entitled to relief had standing
to enjoin a violator,3 9 the vitality of this decision is doubtful, in view of the
general tendency to construe the requirement of standing narrowly.40 Courts
are not often likely to allow an association, not pecuniarily damaged by the
price cutting qua association, to bring an enforcement action.4 1
But if the association itself is unable to obtain standing, this should not
prevent it from directing and financing litigation on behalf of individual re-
38. Cf. id. at 243.
39. Office Mach. Dealers Ass'n v. Tytell Typewriter Co., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 62895
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). In Nassau & Suffolk County Retail Hardware Ass'n v. Korvette-
Hempstead, Inc., 1954 Trade Cas. 69509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), relief %as denied because of
defendant's allegations that the members of plaintiff association were themselves price
cutters, with no discussion of the association's standing to sue. Bergen County Pharma-
ceutical Ass'n v. Barden, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 64015 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1950) held that
the association had no standing to sue because it was not a "producer or distributor of
the commodity or a retailer selling such commodity" as required by the New Jersey Fair
Trade Act. The Pennsylvania act would seem similarly to bar suit by a trade associa-
tion. See note 28 supra. And in Iowa Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. May's Drug Stores, Inc.,
229 Iowa 554, 294 NAV. 756 (1940), the association was disregarded and its members
were treated as individual plaintiffs.
40. See notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
41. The Office Machine Dealers court, see note 39 supra, ignored the issue of whether
the association as an entity was pecuniarily damaged by the price cutting. In consider-
ing a subsequent motion for the ex-amination of witnesses, Office Mach. Dealers Ass'n
v. Tytell Typewriter Co., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. 62911 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), the court
held that the association itself had no rights and that the true plaintiffs were the in-
dividual members of the association. But this did not affect the previous ruling that the
association had the right to sue; therefore it may be implied that the association was
suing as an agent of the members rather than in its own corporate capacity. Since an
association as an entity would not appear to be damaged by price cutting, it would not
have standing to sue for violation of the fair trade acts, by their very terms. See note
28 supra. But see MAINE Rnv. STAT. ANN. ch. 183, § 4 (1954); N.H. R=. STAT. Arm.
§ 357:4 (1955) (damage need not be proved to obtain an injunction). A party claiming
a right under a statute must bring himself within the purview of the act. E.g., Strand
v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 72 N.V.2d 609 (1955) ; Hennenfent v. Flath, 66
N.W2d 533 (N.D. 1954).
Theoretically, however, the price cutter is not put to a disadvantage because a suit for
injunction is brought by an association, assuming that there is a member who would
have standing to sue. The limitations of the decree would be no different from those of
a decree in favor of an individual plaintiff. See notes 111-37 infra and accompanying
text.
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tailers serving as nominal plaintiffs. 42 A New York trial court has upheld
such a practice against a defense of conspiracy in restraint of trade.42 Nor
should traditional rules against barratry and maintenance 44 bar such suits.
So long as the objective of the party financing the litigation is not financial
speculation or harassment of the opposing party, most state courts have sharp-
ly limited barratry and maintenance prohibitions, 4 5 and comparable group
financing of litigation is widely practiced. 40 The barratry statutes recently
passed in four southern states, however, might prove effective barriers to
association enforcement. 47
42. See Note, 69 HARv. L. Ray. 316, 343 (1955).
43. Fogel v. Bolet, 194 Misc. 1019, 91 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
44. "Common barretry [sic] is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up suits
and quarrels . . . either at law or otherwise." 4 BLACXSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134; see
Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526, 530 (D. Mass. 1939).
Maintenance is "an offence that bears a near relation to ... [barratry] ; being an officious
intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either
party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it . . . ." 4 BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *134; see LoGuidice v. Harris, 98 Ohio App. 230, 128 N.E.2d 842 (1954).
In general, barratry statutes add little to the Blackstonian definition, either defining
barratry as the exciting of groundless judicial proceedings, e.g., N.D. R-v. CODE § 12-
1716 (1943) ; N.Y. PEN. LAW § 320; restating the common law definition, as does KAN.
GEN. STAT. § 21-745 (1949) ; or merely declaring common barratry to be a crime, with
no further explanation, as does DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 371. (1953). Contra, statutes
collected note 47 infra; see MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 13 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.12.010 (1951) (detailed definitions). Those states having specific maintenance
statutes have prohibited only one species-champerty. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 135,
§ 18 (1954); N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 274-76. "Champerty ... being a bargain with a plaintiff
or defendant ... to divide the ... matter sued for between them if they prevail at law;
whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense." 4 BLAcK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *135.
45. See, e.g., Vitaphone v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 28 F. Supp. 526, 530 (D.
Mass. 1939) ; Boettcher v. Criscione, 180 Kan. 39, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (1956); Moffett v.
Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Mo. 1955) ; State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411,
17 S.E.2d 511 (1941).
Trade associations would probably at least be permitted to pay the expenses of a re-
tailer suit. It has always been permissible "to maintain the suit of ... a poor neighbor."
4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135; Rice v. Farrell, 129 Conn. 362, 28 A.2d 7 (1942)
(dictum). And organizations formed to enforce legal rights of their members have been
allowed to sue over barratry objections. Brannan v. Stark, 185 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
aff'd, 342 U.S. 451 (1952) (association of milk producers sought to enjoin enforcement
of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture) ; Vitaphone Corp. v. Hutchinson Amuse-
ment Co., supra (motion picture producers formed association to enforce their rights
arising from the copyright law) ; Milk Dealers Bottle Exch. v. Schaffer, 224 Ill. App.
411 (1922) (a clearing-house for milk bottles sues to replevy bottles belonging to its
members).
46. See Vose, N.A.A.C.P. Strategy in the Covenant Cases, 6 W. REs. L. Rav. 101
(1.955); Note, 50 Nw. U.L. Ray. 289 (1955).
47. -Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2049-01 to -08 (1957) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-147 to -147.6
(Supp. 1958); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp. 1958); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18-349.25 to -349.30 (Supp. 1958). The Mississippi Code, for example, forbids any
person or group to "promise, give, or offer,... receive or accept,... solicit, request or
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In fact, associations of retailers seldom bring fair trade suits. Their failure
to do so is probably attributable to anticipation of success disproportionate to
the expense involved. 48 They may, therefore, view their most effective role as
identifying violations and stimulating manufacturer enforcement.40 In addi-
tion, there might not be a sufficient consensus within most retail associations
either on the desirability of observing maintained prices or on the dues neces-
sary to support an enforcement program. Many such associations are com-
posed both of those who favor and those who disapprove of resale price main-
tenance, of price cutters and fair traders."0 Nor have groups of fair-trading
retailers formed specifically for collective enforcement of maintained prices
generally arisen. Expenditures in relation to potential success would remain
a deterrent, while apportionment of litigation expenses among a diverse group,
possible reluctance to make a firm fair trade commitment and, perhaps, failure
of initiative, could make organization difficult.
The Matufacturer
The fair-trading manufacturer does not face many of the obstacles which
deter enforcement by individual retailers and their associations, and most fair
trade litigation has therefore been carried on by manufacturers. 1 Manufac-
turers of fair-traded products ordinarily possess greater resources than most
retailers or groups of retailers. In addition, the manufacturer need not meet
the onerous burden of establishing that he was damaged. In most states, the
fact that a retailer has cut the price of a manufacturer's product suffices to
give the manufacturer standing to bring an action against the price cutter.52
donate, any money... or any other assistance as an inducement . . .to commence or
prosecute ... any proceeding." Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2049-01 (1957). There is little doubt
that these statutes were aimed at the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. See 1 RAcE RE.. L. REP. 956 (1956) (proposal of the Attorney General
of Georgia, recommending the passage of an act restricting the activities of organiza-
tions seeking to encourage litigation); Va. Acts of 1956, ch. 34 (authorizing a committee
to investigate the activities of associations seeking to encourage litigation relating to racial
activities), repealed, Va. Acts of 1958, ch. 373. A federal court has found the Virginia
statute violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment, although the Supreme Court reversed it on procedural grounds. NAACP v. Patty,
159 F. Supp. 503, 533 (E.D. Va. 1958), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
A related Georgia statute, GA. CoDe ANN. § 26-4703 (Supp. 1958), which defines
barratry as "frequently [to] engage in exciting and stirring suits . .. [or to] propose
... to another person that they present and urge a suit," would probably be no hindrance
to fair trade actions by retailer associations.
48. See notes 106-43 infra and accompanying tex-t.
49. FTC RmoRT 243-49, 375.
50. E.g., Letter From the National Retail Merchants Ass'n to the Yale Law Journal,
May 14, 1959, on file in Yale Law Library.
51. GanrLTam 344-45; see note 26 .'upra (about 90% of suits are by manufacturers).
52. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. E M F Elec. Supply Co., 36 F. Supp. 111
199
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
While some manufacturers have testified for the federal bill, have publicly
stated their support for fair trade,53 and have spent large sums on enforce-
ment, this does not necessarily mean that they favor rigid price maintenance.
The manufacturer has little to lose-and much to gain in retailer good will-
by open support of unenforced fair trade.5 4
There is considerable evidence of manufacturer disenchantment with fair
trade. Many have abandoned it entirely by failing to set a minimum resale
price.5 5 Others have openly tolerated or abetted cut prices, 6 or have produced
different brands or unbranded products which have been disposed of through
non-fair-trade channels in competition with their fair-traded primary brandsA5
There are even instances where manufacturers have urged retailers to sell
under the fair-trade price.58
Moreover, the manufacturer is less well placed to uncover fair-trade vio-
lations and obtain evidence of price cutting for litigation purposes than are
retailers, and the costs of investigation alone for the manufacturer with a far-
flung distributive system may be prohibitive.5 9 To avoid the charge of dis-
criminatory enforcement, he may be required to keep up a sustained attack
on a large number of price cutters. 0 Even the manufacturer who can afford
the requisite investigation and litigation may consider such expenditures im-
prudent in light of the limited possibility of effectively eliminating price cut-
ting.0 ' Nonenforcement by manufacturers may also reflect reluctance to risk
damage to good will, since fair trade actions will subject the manufacturer to
the inevitable defense of discriminatory enforcement, and litigation to enforce
higher prices may cause unfavorable sentiment among non-fair-trading retail-
ers and savings-minded consumers.
(D. Mass. 1940); Downs v. Benatar's Cut Rate Drug Stores, 75 Cal. App. 2d 61, 170
P.2d 88 (1946); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E.2d 177 (1950); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N.C. 163, 4 S.E.2d 528 (1939); Borden Co. v. Schreder,
182 Ore. 34, 185 P.2d 581 (1947); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. L. & H. Stores, Inc.,
392 Pa. 225, 139 A.2d 897 (1958); Johnson & Johnson v. Narragansett Wiping Supply
Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 74711 (R.I. Super. Ct.).
53. See, e.g., 1959 Hearings 701-05.
54. See notes 106-43 infra and accompanying text.
55. See note 9 supra.
56. See, e.g., 1958 Hearings 608.
57. MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION 257 (1941) [hereinafter cited as MILLER]; Srocx-
ING & WAKrINs 328; Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, Harv, Bus. Rev. Sept.-
Oct. 1952, p. 47; 1958 Hearings 219.
58. SELIGMAN & LOVE, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 152 (1937) [here-
inafter cited as SELIGMAN & LovE].
59. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text; 1958 Hearings 276, 279, 609. In
Revlon, Inc. v. Wagonfeld, TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) ff 69353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
April 21, 1959), the combined average cost of investigation and suit against each of eight
retailers was over $1000. State fair trade committees have advised smaller manufacturers
that the expenses of fair trade might be prohibitive. FTC REPORT 39.
60. See notes 113-16 infra and accompanying text.
61. See notes 106-43 infra and accompanying text.
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The expense of fair trade enforcement and the possibility of injury to good
will could be deemphasized if rigidly enforced fair trade gave the producer
economic advantage. It might be thought that a manufacturer is able to set
a higher price to dealers and take a higher margin of profits if he is permitted
to fix the price to the ultimate consumer. But the manufacturer's price to
dealers will be no higher merely because he controls the resale price. Whether
or not the product is fair traded, its ultimate price to the consumer is deter-
mined by consumer demand and is composed of the manufacturer's price to
the retailer plus the retailer's markup. In order to maximize his revenue, the
manufacturer will seek to keep his price to the retailer as high as possible;
conversely, to keep the retailer's mark-up as low as possible. But the retailer's
profit margin cannot be pushed below a given minimum; otherwise he will be
forced to discontinue the product. Since the retailer's markup has a floor, the
manufacturer's share has a concomitant ceiling, %t'hich cannot be raised by
resale price maintenance. The manufacturer's retailer price cannot be raised
through fair trade without raising consumer price, and thus lowering demand.
Indeed, resale price maintenance may adversely affect the manufacturer's
revenues by raising retailer markup. Since Robinson-Patman 0 prohibitions
of price discrimination prevent variation in the prices charged to dealers, 0
the margin between the dealer price and the retail price, when both are set by
the manufacturer, must be the same for all retailers, irrespective of their costs.
If the manufacturer leaves enough margin so that the higher cost retailers (for
whose benefit the manufacturer presumably adopted resale price maintenance)
may profit, he will prevent the lower cost, larger scale retailers from passing
on to the consumer the difference between their minimum working mark-up
and the markup forced upon them by the producer's fair-trade policy. To the
extent that higher prices reduce demand, the higher average retailer markup
would result in lower overall demand for the product.04 And if the manu-
facturer lowered his dealer price to offset the higher retailer markup and
maintain demand, his profit margin would be lower.
Despite this disadvantage to the manufacturer, it has been nevertheless
maintained that the manufacturer derives benefits from fair trade which ex-
pand consumer demand for his product more than enough to countervail the
higher average retail markup. First, it is contended that resale price mainte-
nance improves the effectiveness of advertising and allows the manufacturer
to prevent dissipation, resulting from price cutting at the retail level, of his
investment in good will. Second, fair trade is said to enable the manufacturer,
by judicious use of higher retailer margins which can be guaranteed by fair
trade, to ensure a better balanced and more effective distribution system.
The argument that fair trade protects the manufacturer's good will was
endorsed without explanation in the 1936 Supreme Court case of Old Dear-
62. Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C § 13 (1958).
63. Section 2(a) of the act prohibits price discrimination "beteen different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality."
64. See note 97 infra.
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born Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp.,5 and has since been followed
by state and federal courts. 0  This rationale forms the basis of the judicial
presumption that price cutting constitutes "damage" to the manufacturer for
the purpose of conferring standing to bring a fair-trade enforcement suit.07
It has further been developed by fair-trade proponents,0 8 who argue that un-
authorized price cutting undermines a manufacturer's "standard price" and
"quality" advertising.
"Standard price" advertising is most important in the case of products the
demand for which is linked to high price. 0 But such products are rarely fair
traded, and resale price maintenance is not essential to the preservation of
their appealing prices. Few products of this type are mass distributed since
their supply is limited or intentionally held down. Further, most manufac-
turers of such goods will carefully select dealers who, aware that price cutting
may diminish demand, will' not be likely to engage in price competition. More-
over, the manufacturer may keep his price to dealers at sufficiently high levels
to ensure that the products will not be sold too cheaply."0
In the case of products which are normally fair traded, retail sales below
the "standard price" advertised by the manufacturer should not destroy the
effect of this advertising and may, in fact, stimulate additional consumer
demand. Promotion which mentions price is usually aimed at convincing pro-
spective purchasers that the cost is within their budgets, 71 whether it is actual-
ly geared to the product's low price, or to a slightly higher price than other
65. 299 U.S. 183, 193 (1936). The Court further argued that good will is property
which should be protected against injury. Id. at 194-95. Finally, relying upon a "great
body of fact and opinion" and "legislative determination" that price cutting injures the
"good will and business of the producer and distributor of identified goods . . . [and is]
injurious to the general public as well," the Court upheld the validity of the Illinois
Fair Trade Act. Id. at 195-96.
66. See, e.g., Remington Arms Co. v. Gatling, 128 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Pa. 1955);
Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Rosen, 115 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1953) ; Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 109 F. Supp. 269 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 205 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1953); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. L. & H. Stores, 392 Pa. 225, 139
A.2d 897 (1958).
67. See cases collected note 52 supra and accompanying text.
68. E.g., WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs 15 (1938) [hereinafter cited as WEIGEL];
see STOCKING & WATKINS 322-23; GRETHER 85; SELIGMAN & Lovw 185-86; Note, 65
YALE L.J. 235 n.6 (1956) ; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 381 n.2 (1952).
69. These are products usually purchased for purposes of conspicuous consumption.
The demand for such products decreases as does the price. SELIGMAN & LovE 185-86;
STOCKING & WAxINrS 331; Taussig, Price Maintenance, 6 Am. ECON. REv. 170, 172-73
(,Supp. 1916). But see STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PICE 43-44 (1952) [hereinafter cited
as STIGLER] (no instances of more of a commodity being purchased at a higher price).
Sales of these products depend on their exclusive nature. SELIGMAN & LovE 185-86;
STOCKING & WATKINS 326, 331; WAITE & CASSIDY, THE CONSUMER AND TIE ECONOMIC
ORDER 207 (1939); NomuIs, THEORY OF CONSUMER DEMAND 221 (1952); KELLEY, CON-
SUMER DEMAND 228 (1953).




brands. If customers find that the product is offered for sale at prices below
those generally advertised, they are likely to be more readily enticed into a
purchase since the cut price will appear even more reasonable. The alternate
hypothesis-that consumers will be repelled by a suspicion that the manufac-
turer is making exorbitant profits at the advertised price 7-- has never been
empirically verified and, on its face, seems less tenable. A comparable dis-
parity between the selling price of the fair-trading retailer and discount seller
will also obtain for competing goods whether fair traded or not. And, seeing
that the advertised product's cut-rate price remains proportionally constant
to those of competing products,7 3 the buyer will be unlikely to view the stand-
ard price as inordinate. The fact that non-fair-traded products can be and are
commonly advertised as selling at the manufacturer's suggested price74 is
further proof that fair-trade price rigidity at the retail level is unnecessary to
effective "standard price" advertising.
The argument that price maintenance would enable manufacturers to pre-
vent price cutting from undermining advertising which emphasizes product
quality is more forceful. The great disparity in price resulting from competi-
tion at the retail level, it is contended, will cause consumers to doubt the
quality of -the product.7r Use of a product as a "leader'"-selling it at a par-
ticularly low price in order to attract consumers and promote sales of all mer-
chandise-is viewed as particularly injurious to the manufacturer's quality
reputation.7" But this argument overlooks some vital facts of price cutting and
"leader" selling. The retailer's purpose is defeated if consumers associate cut-
ting of the leader's price with a dimunition in its quality. 1 The retailer will
therefore emphasize the quality of the leader as a necessary part of the sell-
ing campaign, thus perhaps increasing, rather than decreasing, the product's
72. See THE BRA-NEIs GumE TO THE MODERN WORLD 216 (Lief ed. 1941) [hereinafter
cited as BRANDE s].
73. If the normal retail price is higher than that of competing products, price to
dealers usually will be proportionately higher, and therefore the advertised product's dis-
counted price should bear the same relation to the discounted prices of other products
as will their undiscounted prices. A similar result will obtain if the advertised product's
normal price is lower than that of competing brands.
74. See, e.g., Esquire, March 1959, p. 19 (slacks ad); Life, April 6, 1959, p. 142
(carpeting).
75. See WEIGEL 15; BRANDEIs 216; SELIGMAN & LovE 185-86; Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenance, 21. U. CHL L. Rnv. 175, 184-86 (1954) ; Note, 65 YALE L.J. 235 n.6 (1956) ;
Note, 61 Y.ALE LJ. 381 & n.2 (1952). See also STIGLm 44; STOCKING & WATinS 331;
HIARIxG, RETAIL PRICE CUTTING 8, 144 (1935) [hereinafter cited as HARNG] ; Note, 69
HAnv. L. REv. 316, 327 (1956).
76. See YA.wEY 94; ZoaR & FELDmAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEW Pnice LAWs 267
(1937) [hereinafter cited as Zoiur & FELDMAN] ; HARING 7-8; Bovman, The Prerequisites
and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 82-5, 836 (1955).
77. SELIGMAN & LovE 145; GRETHER 267; see YAMEY 64. Ordinarily, products used
as leaders are widely known brands which the consumer associates with quality. See
Statement of Stanley Weigel, 1959 Hearings 349-50; 1958 Hearings 36S; Y -ux 63-64,
98 & n.2; GRTHuER 203, 267; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 381 & n.2.
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good will. 78 Additionally, use of a manufacturer's product as a leader should,
by lowering its price, stimulate demand (a stimulus which is treated by the
retailer as an advertising expense) .79 Competing retailers' sales of the product
employed as a leader are likely to drop off-it is these retailers who are in-
jured by "leader" selling-but the lower average retail price should increase
overall demand for the manufacturer's product.
Use of the manufacturer's product for "bait" or substitution selling, it is
true, may adversely affect the manufacturer's quality advertising. Substitution
selling occurs when a dealer advertises a well known product for sale at a
lower than usual price in order to create the false impression that he sells
other articles of standard or known value on similarly favorable terms. The
substitution seller, having thus attracted customers, will attempt to induce
buyers to purchase substitutes on which the dealer makes a higher profit.80
Since the dealer's efforts to substitute the more profitable product for the
"bait" will normally involve deprecation of the latter, the manufacturer's good
will could be seriously injured. But such practices face illegality under both
the Federal Trade Commission Act 81 and state statutes prohibiting false and
misleading advertising.8 2 It is doubtful that additional illegality under the fair-
trade laws would substantially assist in eliminating substitution selling. In
78. SELIGMAN & LovE 145; GrIER 267. Even if the price cutter did not point out
the stability of the quality, the average consumer realizes that a reduced price on several
widely advertised products is not due to a sudden change in quality but rather to the
retailer's desire to attract business. See Schactman, Resale Price Maitenance and the
Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. PITT. L. REV. 562, 577 (1950). The use of leaders is usually
accompanied by advertising on the retail level, in order to inform the consumer of the
bargain. YAmEY 39; WAITE & CASSIDY, THE CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMic ORDER 305
(1939) ; KELLEY, CONSUMER EcoNoMics 239-40 (1953).
79. YAMEY 98; ZORN & FELDMAN 256; Statement of Q. Forrest Walker, in HAMNO
15.
80. GRETHER 267-69; ZORN & FELDMAN 267; YAmEY 99; HAING 27, 191; Bowman,
supra note 76, at 836. In fact, price maintenance may encourage substitution. A price
cutter, although unable to advertise a fair-traded product at a cut price, can compare the
prices of that product and a private brand of like quality once the customer is in the
store Ibid.
81. Section 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958) (proscribing "unfair
methods of competition"). For FTC rulings that "bait" advertising constitute violations
of § 5, see Forrest A. Jones, 52 F.T.C. 1192 (1956); 16 C.F.R. § 25.20 (1959) (trade
practice conference rules for combination storm window and door industry).
82. Some states specifically prohibit "bait" advertising. E.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 361; see Note, 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1019, 1063 & n.275 (1956). Forty-four states and
the District of Columbia have enacted the "Printers Ink Model Statute." Id. at 1058.
This statute makes violations a misdemeanor and requires proof of three elements: (1)
an intent to sell, dispose of, or increase the consumption of goods or services; (2) the
advertising of such intent; and (3) the existence in such advertising of statements or
representations of fact which are untrue, deceptive or misleading. Id. at 1059; e.g., N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 421. This statute has been used against "bait" advertising, People v. Glubo,




addition, substitution selling, because of its illegality and ineffectiveness, is
rare and is used only by less scrupulous dealers. 3
It has also been argued that fair trade can aid the manufacturer in the
development of a more advantageous distribution system. By assuring higher
markups through price maintenance, the manufacturer may be able to prevent
the competitive elimination of fair-trade outlets.8 4 Even if such retailers do
not make large volume sales, it is argued, they promote the manufacturer's
products personally to individual buyers 85 and display the products more
widely.8 6 The greater accessibility of the products is said to encourage impulse
purchases by customers frequenting proximately located stores sT and provide
relatively inexpensive advertising. Furthermore, competitive elimination of
fair-trade retailers, it is contended, would leave a relatively small number of
large retailers and place the manufacturer in a less advantageous bargaining
position. The remaining retailers, the argument runs, may force price con-
cessions from the manufacturer-particularly the smaller producer.m Once
their market power is sufficient, they may also take a higher markup to maxi-
mize their profits and thereby decrease sales below the point of optimum rev-
enue for the manufacturer.8 9 Or, having exhausted the competitive advantages
of using the product as a leader, they may drop it.' °
These arguments are far from persuasive. While the typical manufacturer
will desire a maximum number and variety of retail outlets, the number which
he can profitably service and supply may be limited. He will therefore wish
to retain only those outlets for which the costs of service and supply do not
outweigh the increased revenues from these outlets plus the advantages which
he may derive from wider display and promotion."' It is unlikely that the
absence of price maintenance would force out of business large numbers of
key retailers; the retailers most vulnerable to price competition are those
from which the manufacturer will ordinarily draw little revenue.
83. 19.58 Hearings 603-04, 614, 617, 632; YAuEY 99-100. But see SEUiGiAN & Lov
153.
84. GRETHER 268, 269; YAMEY 49, 91, 105; Bowman, supra note 76, at 837; Note,
64 HARv. L. R-v. 1327 (1951). The primary purpose of fair trade was to prevent small
retailers from being driven out of business by price cutting. View of Department of Com-
merce in Hearings on H.R. 5767 Before the Senate Conuitlee on Inlerstate and Foreign
Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952) ; Statement of Dr. John Blair, Assistant Chief
Economist of the Federal Trade Commission, id. at 33.
85. See YAmEY 4-5; FTC REPoRT 134-35; WEIGEL 15; Bowman, stpra note 76, at
846 n.65; Hawklins, Further Theoretical Considerations Regarding Fair Trade Laws, 4
J. MARKETING 126, 128 (1939).
86. See GErHER 269, 270-71; Bowman, supra note 76, at 827; Note, 64 HARv. L.
REv. 316, 327 (1955).
87. See YA "EY 49-52; Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, Harv. Bus. Rev.
Sept.-Oct. 1952, pp. 47, 51.
88. See YAmEv 9, 18-19; HAPING 42-45, 49-50, 125; Gn-rnEa 269; ST-..nG &
WATKiNS 323; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 381, 391 (1952).
89. See YAmEY 91; Bowman, supra note 76, at 838.
90. GRETHER 269; ZoRK & FELDMAN 267; BRANDEIs 217.
91. See HARING 164; SELIGmAN & LOvE 201,
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Increased bargaining power of retailers through the elimination of small
competitors should pose little threat to manufacturers.02 While the economies
of scale in retailing seemingly dictate larger outlets and chains, it is doubtful
that the optimum size of the retail firm is so large that, under competitive
conditions, only a number which would constitute a highly concentrated mar-
ket would survive. 93 Since viable size would probably be attainable by new
entrants, attempts to raise markups above competitive levels or to drop a
popular product would signal the establishment of new outlets.
It is further argued that the retailer, in exchange for the higher markup
furnished by fair trade, will be more active in persuading consumers to buy
the price-maintained product, will make greater advertising outlays, display
the product more prominently, and provide additional services in promoting
sales of the product. At the same time, he will attempt to discourage sales of
competing, non-fair-traded products, on which he is not assured as advan-
tageous a markup.94 The principal difficulty with this argument, assuming its
validity, is that competing manufacturers may pursue the same policy. If so,
the retailer will have no reason to promote one product rather than another;
his markup on all sales will be similarly guaranteed. 95 When that occurs, the
retail price for all brands is increased.9 0  The result may be a decrease in
demand for the item, diminishing industry revenue.97
92. It is unlikely that the number of retailers will be so reduced in most areas as
to constitute an effective oligopsony. YAMEY 91 ; G ETHER 279. And any agreement which
would achieve this effect would probably violate Sherman Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
Further, the enhanced market power of large retailers might pose no greater threat
to manufacturers than the power currently possessed by some of the associations of fair-
trading retailers. See FTC REPORT 166-218; MUND 440; 1958 Hearings 633.
93. See BAIN, BARRmRS To NEw COMPETITION 11-15 (1956).
94. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text.
95. See YAMEY 8-10; Hawkins, Further Theoretical Considerations Regarding Fair
Trade Laws, 4 J. MARKrING 126, 128 (1939); Bowman, Resale Price Maintenancc-
A Motwpoly Problem, 25 U. Cm. J. Bus. 141, 150 (1952).
96. Most commentators are in agreement that fair trade has resulted in an increase
in prices above those prevailing in a state of competition. See, c.g., WAITE & CAssIDY,
THE CONSUMER AND THE ECONOMIC ORDER 267 (1939) ; STOCKING & WATKINS 324, 329-
30 & n.34; FTC REPORT XLv-LI, 131-35; YAmEY 3-4, 109, 130; SELIGMAN & Low 230;
Schactman, supra note 78, at 584; Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 25
(1955) ; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 381, 390 (1952) ; Letter From Eugene V. Rostow, Dean
of Yale Law School, 1958 Hearings 661. But see Adams, Resale Price Maintcnance:
Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955), and Fair Trade and the Art of Prestidigita-
tion, 65 YALE L.J. 196, 199, 202-03 (1955). And such consumer welfare organizations as
have submitted statements or testified before the 1958 hearings have all been in agree-
ment as to the increase in price caused by fair trade. See Statements of Consumer's
Federation of St. Louis, 1958 Hearings 199-207; Consumers Conference of Greater Cin-
cinnati, id. at 239-43; Consumers Information Bureau, id. at 676-78. See also Consumers
Reports, May 1.958, reproduced in id. at 212-18, and statements submitted by farmers,
id. at 320-21 (American Farm Bureau), 643-44 (Kansas Farm Bureau).
But the proponents of fair trade legislation have sought to prove that fair trade has
not caused a price increase. They argue that most surveys have not been truly repre-
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Furthermore, direct adjustments in price (advertising or service allowance)
would provide a more effective incentive to compensable retailer promotion. 8
Unlike the higher retailer markup resulting from fair trade, which all retailers
would receive regardless of performance, such allowances can be made con-
tingent upon effective promotional efforts.93 Provided such allowances are
available on proportionally equal terms to all outlets, they would not constitute
Robinson-Patman price discrimination. 100 Such allowances, of course, could be
paid for by the manufacturer through an increase in price to his dealers. If
the retailer passes this increase on to the consumer, the effect upon product
demand should be no more serious than a higher fair-trade price.
If the price-maintenance markup provided a sufficiently strong inducement
for a substantial number of dealers to agree to sell the manufacturer's fair-
traded products exclusively, the manufacturer would gain considerable advan-
tage over his competitors. 01 But it is highly dubious that the offer of a fair-
trade markup would be sufficient consideration for an exclusive dealership.
Further, the desired result-foreclosure of a substantial number of outlets-
would be subject to attack under section 3 of the Clayton Act.10 2
None of the foregoing advantages claimed for fair trade, even if they out-
weigh the adverse effects of higher average retailer markups, would aid the
manufacturer unless he could afford to ignore dealers who refuse to adhere
to fair-trade prices. If he, through fair trade, fully protects price-maintenance
dealers in any market area, he must forego distribution of his product through
the price cutters in that area. Such a position could profitably be taken only
by the unusual manufacturer who can sufficiently differentiate his products
to create an inelastic demand unaffected by higher price and thus force the
price cutter to sell the product at the fair-trade price or lose business.103 In
the case of the typical product, however, a price cutter would counter a manu-
facturer's insistance on price maintenance with the promotion of competing,
non-fair-traded substitutes. 04 Moreover, a manufacturer cannot enforce price
sentative, and that a Nielson survey, sponsored by the Bureau of Education on Fair
Trade, comparing prices on 15 brands in fair-trade areas and non-fair-trade areas proves
the consumer, in general, pays about the same for each brand in both areas. Statement
of Maurice fermey, Director, Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, 1959 Hcarings 62.
But if the Nielson survey is accurate, the manufacturer has no need for fair trade.
97. YAmEY 11; HI-RinG 189, 191. If the product as a group has a classical demand
curve, as is most probable, the increased price will cause a decreased demand. SzaaUM
43-44; SAmLm.sos\, Eco.xomics 441 (4th ed. 1958).
98. HAmnIG 42; YAimS 53-55. See generally HARING 42-65 on advertising allow-
ances.
99. See sources cited note 98 supra.
100. See A'rT'Y GEN. REP. 189-90.
101. See YmxEy 20; Bowman, supra note 76, at 845-48.
102. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
103. See HAMNG 8; FTC RE'oRT 7-8; 1959 Hearings 502; Bowman, =nPra note 76,
at 836.
104. See GRETHER 267-68, 272-73; HRANG 7; SELIGMAN & Lov 178-79; YAMEY 6.
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maintenance against some dealers and at the same time distribute products to
and abstain from prosecution of other large volume price cutters. Any at-
tempt at such discriminatory enforcement would be defeated. 10 5
In view of the increasing share of the retail market possessed by the non-
fair-trade dealers, few manufacturers would be willing to give up sales to these
outlets. In addition, display and promotion by high-overhead price-maintain-
ing retailers, with limited advertising budgets, would seldom be of greater
import than the promotion resulting from price competition. Furthermore, the
mass media typically employed by price cutters may reach more buyers, while
lower price tags may be more persuasive than the most diligent personal pro-
motion. In sum, the impossibility of reconciling a vigorous fair-trade enforce-
ment program with the preponderant role of "price cutters" in promoting and
selling their goods, combined with the speculative nature of fair trade's bene-
fits when compared with its escalator effect on average retailer markup, would
indicate that the ordinary manufacturer would be unenthusiastic or, at best,
neutral about fair-trade enforcement.
FAIR TRADE mEDIES
Whatever the interests of retailers and manufacturers in fair trade, their
ability to bring successful actions against price cutters necessarily depends
upon the remedies available. Most state statutes do not explicitly provide
remedies; they merely make price-maintenance violations actionable, and thus
leave the courts and the parties free to determine appropriate relief.100 The
federal bill, following the minority states, 10 7 would effectuate enforcement
specifically through injunction and an award of "damages sustained."108 In
addition, victorious plaintiffs would recover reasonable counsel fees from vio-
lators.100
An injunction against future price cutting is the remedy most often obtained
in suits under state fair trade laws.1' 0 But a considerable obstacle to success-
ful injunctive actions by retailers is the ubiquitous equitable defense of "un-
clean hands," which, in this context, means that the plaintiff has also sold
105. See notes 113-16 infra and accompanying text.
106. E.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. ConE § 16904; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 369-a.
107. E.g., ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. ch. 183, § 4 (1954) (injunction plus three times
amount of actual damages); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357:4 (1955) (same).
108. H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, p. 7, lines 6-11 (1959).
109. H.R. 1253, supra note 108, at 7, lines 12-13.
110. Although most fair trade acts contain no specific provision for injunctive relief,
see note 106 supra and accompanying text, such relief has been frequently awarded, see,
e.g., Ampex Corp. v. Goody Audio Center, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 1072, 163 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup.
Ct. 1957). Other statutes expressly provide for injunctive relief. See note 107 supra.
It is thought by some that an injunction is the only practical method of enforcing
resale price maintenance. See Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Nussbaum Liquor Store, Inc.,




the product at less than the maintained price."' If plaintiff could prove that
his price cutting, indulged in only to meet competition, postdated that of de-
fendant, and that he promptly brought suit, it might be argued that a pre-
sumption that plaintiff's price cutting was self-defensive should arise which
would overcome his unclean hands. But such a theory has not received judicial
recognition. Nor have courts generally been willing to condition decrees upon
plaintiff's agreement to abstain from future price cutting or upon plaintiff's
consent to submit to a similar decree.112
Injunctive suits by manufacturers have likewise been prevented by a defense
which carries the label of "unclean hands." A manufacturer's "unclean hands"
refers to discrimination in his enforcement-the selection of defendant from
a number of equally culpable, but unsued, price cutters.",3 This defense may
be based on the rationale that the manufacturer, by his failure to sue, has
abandoned price maintenance or is estopped from any enforcement." 4 Alter-
natively, or in addition, the defendant may claim that singling him out for
prosecution would unjustly disadvantage him in relation to competitors." 3
Since a manufacturer cannot simultaneously prosecute every price cutter, the
defendant who alleges discriminatory enforcement must affirmatively demon-
strate the manufacturer's failure to follow a consistently diligent enforcement
policy." 6 But, probably because manufacturers are hesitant to prosecute large-
111. See, e.g., Boesch v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 9 Conn. Supp. 110 (Super.
Ct 1941); Bathasweet Corp. v. Weissbard, 128 N.J. Eq. 135, 15 A.2d 337 (Ch. 1940);
Fogel v. Bolet, 194 Misc. 1019, 91 N.Y.S2d 642 (Sup. Ct 1949).
112. Such a consent decree was the solution adopted in Gurock v. Brandie-Wine
Stores, Inc., 101 N.Y.L.J. 38 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
113. See Lionel Corp. v. Klein, 114 A-2d 652 (Ch. Del. 1955); Hutzler Bros. v.
Remington Putman Book Co., 186 Md. 210, 46 A.2d 101 (1946). But see Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp. v. Harry Fox, Inc., 87 N.Y.S2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1941); National Distillers
Prods. Corp. v. Columbus Circle Liquor Stores, Inc., 166 Misc. 719, 2 N.Y.S2d 319 (Sup.
Ct. 1938). And, an injunction has been made conditional upon continued vigorous enforce-
ment by the manufacturer. General Elec. Co. v. R. H. Macy & Co., 199 Misc. 87, 103
N.Y.S2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Most decisions denying the defense of "unclean hands" have been based upon a find-
ing of a sincere effort by the manufacturer to enforce his prices, in spite of a lack of
success. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Lee-Wilson, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 591 (D. Mass.
1955) ; Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); Lionel Corp. v. Klein, supra; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz, 133
N.Y.S.2d 908 (Sup. Ct 1954); Hutzler Bros. v. Remington Putman Book Co., supra.
114. General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. 71514 (Ky.
Cir. Ct.); Magazine Repeating Razor Co. v. Weissbard, 125 N.J. Eq. 593, 7 A2d 411
(Ch. 1939); Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. A. Rosenblum, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 74510
(N.Y. Sup. Ct).
115. See Miles Labs., Inc. v. Ann & Hope Factory Outlet, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas.
74816 (RI. Super. Ct.) (defense allowed). Contra, Calvert Distillers Corp. v. Stockman,
26 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). Cases where the plaintiff is a retailer have also in-
volved the "competition" defense. See Ray Kline, Inc. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc., 168
Misc. 185, 4 N.Y.S2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Schimpf v. R. H. Macy & Co., 166 Misc.
654, 2 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
116. See cases cited note 113 supra.
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volume price cutters, who may be good customers, the defense has not been
difficult to establish.
Another limitation of injunctive relief is that it is inoperative during the
often lengthy interval between bill and decree. While plaintiffs have sought to
overcome this defect by requesting preliminary injunctions or temporary
restraining orders, the courts have been unwilling freely to grant these ex-
traordinary remedies. 1 17 Issuance of such interim relief requires a high stand-
ard of proof; irreparable injury to plaintiff which outweighs any possible in-
terim damage to the defendant.""' Since normally only affidavits rather than
evidence are received at the hearing,119 an apparently bona fide defense which
eventually proves unsupportable can defeat issuance of temporary decrees or
orders.
120
The inconsequence of the fines awarded to the plaintiff if the defendant is
held in contempt has also limited the effectiveness of injunctions. The amount
is fixed by the courts,12' unless limited by statute, 12 2 and, possibly because they
lack conviction that price cutting should be deterred, they have usually set
fines at low levels.12" Thus, the defendant has been able to continue his price
cutting, submitting himself to periodic contempt assessments as part of the
117. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. American Wholesale Co., 235 F2d 606 (7th Cir.
1956); Mogen David Wine Corp. v. Borenstein, 267 Wis. 503, 66 N.W.2d 157 (1954).
In New York, however, the courts have been more lenient. See General Elec. Co. v.
Masters, Inc., 122 N.YS.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 827, 118 N.Y.S.2d
927 (1953) (granting plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction against price cut-
ting although a triable issue of fact existed).
118. See Comment, 40 MARQ. L. Rsv. 191 (1956). See also D. FuNIAIK, MODNU
EQuIry 16 (1950); Note, 4 S.C.L.Q. 540 (1952).
119. See 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 936, comment e (1939) ; cases cited note 120 in!ra.
120. See, e.g., Boesch v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 9 Conn. Supp. 110 (Super.
Ct. 1941) ; Anderson v. Sonbac Sales Corp.. TRADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) 169287
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 10, 1959).
121. E.g., Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md. 475, 77 A.2d 305 (1950) ; see
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ; United States v. Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen, 95 F. Supp. 1019 (D.D.C. 1951).
122. In New York, for example, the maximum fine is set by statute at $250 plus
costs. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 773.
123. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Quint, 139 F. Supp. 804 (D. Mass. 1956) (costs of con-
ducting contempt proceeding $750, fine of $500 for "divers" violations-"I do not believe
that . . . [I am obligated] to award plaintiff's actually incurred expenses, but only what
. ..would appear somewhat conservatively reasonable.") ; General glec. Co. v. Trubitz,
1956 Trade Cas. 71184 (N.Y. Sup Ct.) ($100 fine for two violations; motion for costs
plus attorney's fee denied); Sherwin Williams Co. v. J. P. Paint Co., 1956 Trade Cas.
71183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) ($50 fine for one violation); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bernstein,
1.956 Trade Cas. 72311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (fine of $400 for 4 violations plus $150 counsel
fee) ; Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Harvard Stores, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 70158 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.) (fine of $50 plus $50 counsel fee). But see Sunbeam Corp. v. J. Eis & Sons
Appliances, 1956 Trade Cas. 71693 (S.D.N.Y.) (defendant ordered to pay plaintiff's
$600 expenses including attorney's fees for bringing 6 violations to notice of court);
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Wallach, 4 Misc. 2d 796, 162 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1956)
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price of doing business. It is not unusual for an aggressive retailer to be held
in contempt of fair-trade injunctions a dozen or more times.12 4
Recently, an attempt has been made in Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Ruie
Appliance Co.12 5 to overcome the difficulties of proving the extent of con-
tempt-caused losses through the assessment and award of a sum equal to the
contemnor's profits on sales made in violation of the injunction.'-" The Sec-
ond Circuit stated that postinjunction profits should be awarded a manufac-
turer-plaintiff, but three separate opinions advanced three different theories.
According to Judge Hincks, the defendant had misappropriated the manu-
facturer's good will and must therefor account for profits derived from prop-
erty illegally dealt with.' 2 7 The theories of the two concurring opinions would
appear equally applicable when a retailer is seeking the contempt award.
Judge L. Hand reasoned that the price cutter received the goods subject to
the lawful condition that they would not be sold below the fair-trade price,
and that his profits could be assessed to the extent that he violated that con-
dition.'28 Judge Lumbard viewed the assessment of profits simply as an ap-
propriate contempt fine for violation of a fair-trade injunction, in the absence
of a statutory limitation of such finesYm0
The Hincks and Hand Golden Rile opinions suggest that accountings can
be ordered, as original relief, as well as assessments for contempts stemming
($500 fine for "several" violations); General Elec. Co. v. Macher Watch Co., 19504951
Trade Cas. 64118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1950) (fined $250 for one violation).
These sums seem particularly low in view of the fact that each known violation--
usually brought to light by professional investigators-probably represents countless un-
known violations.
In New York, where preliminary injunctions are not unusual, see note 117 epra,
they have been made permanent through consent decrees, which contain fairly high penal-
ties in case of noncompliance, see, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Nathan S. Goldfarb Estate,
Inc., N.Y.L.J. Feb. 26, 1958, p. 6, col. 6 (Sup. C.) ($,500 for two cut-rate sales plus
$150 counsel fees). These penalties seem functionally closer to the in& fcrrorem fine than
to the normal civil contempt fine. See notes 135-37 infra and accompanying text. Absent
the availability of temporary injunctive relief, however, see note 117 supra and accom-
panying text, consent decrees would be unusual, and this method of fair trade enforcement
rare. Nonetheless, such a procedure is not unknown outside of New York. See Seagram
Distillers Corp. v. Mfills Cut Rate Liquor Mart, Inc., 1957 Trade Cas. 72824 (Md. Cir.
Ct).
124. E.g., Brief for Appellee, p. 6 (19 different occasions), Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden
Rule Appliance Co., 252 F2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958).
125. 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958).
126. The notion of recovering the price cutter's profits apparently derives from patent
and trademark cases, in which the courts have allowed the owner of the patent or mark
to recover the profits of an infringer. See, e.g., Maternally Yours, Inc. %. Your Mater-
nity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1-956); Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 213
F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1954).
127. 252 F2d at 470-71.
128. Id. at 471.
129. Id. at 472. Since the action was in a federal court, Judge Lumbard reasoned,
the New York statutory limit on contempt fines, see note 122 mipra, was inapplicable.
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from disobedience of an injunction, under those state statutes which do not
specifically provide remedies. 130 But in the only reported case in which an
accounting was sought as a primary remedy, Sunbeam Corp. v. Civil Serv.
Employees' Co-op. Ass'n,"' the Third Circuit required that a manufacturer-
enforcer prove injury in the amount of the defendant's profits.13 2 Such a
requirement, designed to prevent a windfall to the plaintiff, would normally
render any recovery of profits impossible. But even if the proof-of-damage
rule of Civil Service, which was decided seven years before Golden Ride, is
inapplicable in contempt actions, or in suits by retailers,13 3 plaintiff might not
be able to prove the amount of defendant's profits in violation of the injunc-
tion. The experienced price cutter, fearing contempt action (or bills for ac-
counting), may not keep or may destroy inculpating records.'3 4 In Golden
Rule itself, spoliation of defendant's records was allowed to defeat the re-
covery entirely.'3 5
Plaintiffs have also sought in terrorem fines.'3 0 Such fines are imposed
prospectively and determine in advance, similarly to liquidated damages pro-
visions, the amount which contemnor must pay to plaintiff upon future vio-
lation.137 In addition, the defendant may sometimes be forced to accept an
ex parte finding of subsequent violation. 138 The use of in terrorem fines in
fair trade enforcement is of recent date, and, in view of the fair trade history
of ordinary contempt fines, their future is at best uncertain.
Damages have also proved an unsatisfactory remedy for the enforcement of
resale price maintenance. Although damages have been frequently requested, 3 0
they have been awarded to manufacturers in only three reported cases-in
one case compensatory plus exemplary damages ;1.0 in another, nominal plus
130. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
131. 187 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
132. The reasoning of the Third Circuit was that a manufacturer receives the same
profit on each article whether the article was sold at or below the fair-trade price, and
therefore he had no right to profits of the defendant. 187 F.2d at 773. This reasoning is
directly contra to Judge Hincks' Golden Ride opinion for the court, although not to Judge
Hand's concurring opinion.
133. See 187 F.2d at 773 ("if anyone has lost anything by virtue of price reduction
... it is other retailers who might have sold the goods . . . at the regular price and
made a profit").
134. Cf. note 32 supra and accompanying text.
135. 252 F.2d at 472, 473.
136. 'See Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 471 (2d Cir.
1958) ; General Elec. Co. v. Waldman, 159 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Pa. 1958) ; General Elec.
Co. v. Dinsen & Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 69272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
137. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
138. The amount of the fine is determined with an eye toward deterrence of the
defendant; the most important factor is his financial situation. See id. at 303-07.
139. Note, 69 HARv. L. R~v. 316, 321 n.4 (1955).
140. 'Sunbeam Corp. v. Nossoff, 1950-1951 Trade Cas. 64894 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1951)
("compensatory and exemplary damages" measured by difference between fair-trade price
and cut price on all known violations).
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punitive damages ;141 and in a third damages based upon plaintiff's investiga-
tive costs and counsel fees.' 42 Retailers or an association of retailers have
never received damages of any sort. While they may be able to show a
slackening in sales, estimates of the decrease in business attributable to price
reductions by a particular competitor have apparently been unacceptable to
the courts. 143 The causal connection between injury to a manufacturer and the
activities of a particular price cutter may be just as difficult to prove. A manu-
facturer may be successful if he can show that fonner outlets have discon-
tinued his product in the wake of defendant's price cutting,144 but such a
clear-cut connection between a loss of sales and price cutting by the-particular
defendant will be rare. In addition, the loss of sales to those retailers may be
more than offset by increase in sales to price cutters. If the manufacturer's
claim is based on injury to his good will or his distribution system, rather
than to his sales, no accurate measure of damages is available. As discussed
above, it is dubious whether the manufacturer's good will or distribution are
damaged at all by price cutting; consequently, proof of such damages will
seldom be satisfactory.
CONCLUSION
Although courts and legislatures have viewed the fair trade laws as pri-
marily for the benefit of manufacturers, 45 analysis reveals no substantial rea-
sons for manufacturer support of resale price maintenance. 140 Indeed, with
recent developments in retailing methods, the manufacturers' interests are be-
coming increasingly out of harmony with fair-trade objectives, and a growing
number of retailers adamantly oppose a noncompetitive market.' 47 Hence, the
principal proponents of fair trade are smaller, higher cost retailers.'4 8 But fair
trade enforcement by these retailers has been exceedingly difficult.
The federal bill would afford little added protection for them. While vastly
extending fair trade coverage, it would not provide the means to overcome
present obstacles to effective enforcement. The proposed statute would not
141. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal. App. 2d 393, 221 P2d 965 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1950).
142. Revlon, Inc. v. Wagonfeld, TADE REG. REP. (1959 Trade Cas.) fi 69353 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. April 21, 1959).
143. See WEIGEL 78.
144. See cases cited notes 140-41 supra; cf. Sunbeam Corp. v. Economy Distrib. Co.,
131 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. lich. 1955).
145. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text. State legislatures have also de-
clared the purpose of fair-trade legislation to be the protection of the manufacturer's
good will. E.g., 'MD. CODE ANN. art 83, §§ 102-10 (Supp. 1957), Revere Camera Co. v.
Masters Mail Order Co., 128 F. Supp. 457 (D. Md. 1955) ; N.J. STAT. A.N. § 56:4-3
(Supp. 1958). But see Frank Fischer Merchandising Corp. v. Ritz Drug Co., 129 N.J. Eq.
105, 19 A.2d 454 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941).
146. See notes 51-105 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 10-11, 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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make injunctions, adequate contempt fines or compensatory damages easier
to obtain than under existing legislation. The judicial doctrines of standing,
"unclean hands," and judicial reluctance or inability to measure damages have
become well-embedded in precedent and would be unaffected by the bill. Nor
would access to the federal courts irrespective of diversity jurisdiction 149 and
waiver of jurisdictional amount where "an injunction lies," 1r0 as provided by
the bill, have an impact on these factors, which are as firmly established in
the federal courts as in the state courts. Further, limitation of pecuniary
awards under the federal bill to "the amount of damage sustained" 15 1 would
presumably eliminate any possibility for exemplary damages or an accounting.
Only the clause permitting plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's fees in a
successful suit 152 would ease the financial burden of enforcement. Such re-
imbursement, however, would only be of minimal assistance to the enforcer
since counsel costs may well be insignificant as compared with investigatory
expenses.15
3
149. H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, p. 7, lines 6-20 (1959).
150. H.R. 1253, supra note 149, at 7, lines 6-13.
151. H.R. 1253, supra note 149, at 7, lines 10-11.
152. H.R. 1253, supra note 149, at 7, lines 11-13.
153. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
